Los Angeles Rams Football Club V. Cannon

Los Angeles Rams Football Club v. Cannon 185 F. Supp. 717 (S. D. Cal. 1960) Plaintiff prays for an injunction to restrain defendant playing football or engaging in related activities for anyone other than the plaintiff without the plaintiff’s consent during the term of a contract or contracts allegedly entered into by the parties on November 30, 1959, and an order declaring the existence of a valid written contract or contracts. Defendant denies he ever entered into a contract or contracts as alleged and further claims, as defenses to plaintiff’s claims, fourteen affirmative defenses.Cannon never formally accepted the contract offered, therefore it is only an offer. The Commissioner never signed the contract so this makes not valid. There did not come into existence a valid written contract or contracts binding upon plaintiff and defendant there is no basis upon which to consider plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief or defendant’s affirmative defenses i n opposition thereto. Specifically, therefore, I make no findings as to the issues of fraud and deceit, or any other of the equitable issues raised by defendant’s affirmative defenses.Judgment will be for defendant, with costs†¦. Sample v. Gotham Football Club, Inc. 59 F. R. D. 160 (S. D. N. Y. 1973) Defendant is the owner and operator of a professional football team popularly known as the â€Å"New York Jets. † On September 1, 1968, it entered into three separately executed written agreements with plaintiff under which plaintiff was required to render services as a professional football player for the 1968, 1969 and 1970 football seasons. Each document represents the agreement between plaintiff and defendant for a different year.The current dispute only pertains to the contracts covering the 1969 and 1970 football seasons. The New York court of appeals has stated that when the terms of a written contract are clear and unambiguous the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the language used to express such intent. Plaintiff argues that an injury was sustained during the performance of a three-year contract he is entitled to his salary for the remaining term of the contract. Defendant argues that they were three separate one year contract and would only be liable to pay for the season the injury took place.After determining that the exercise of the option clause had the effect of creating a new contract with the plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit concluded: [I]t follows that Hennigan was not entitled to compensation for the 1967 football season from the Chargers. He suffered no injury while in the performance of any services required of him after the option was exercised. Consequently, he is not entitled to payment under paragraph 15 (the injury provision) The result reached above concerning Sample’s second claim is thus on all fours with Hennigan.Reviewing the dispositions, the court denies plaintiff’s cross-motion for summar y judgment on both its first and second causes of action†¦. Eckles v. Sharman 548 F. 2d 905 (10th Cir. 1977) This is an action by the owner of a professional basketball team for breach of contract by a former coach and for the inducement of that breach by the owner of another professional basketball team. Judgment was entered on a jury verdict for $250,000 against the coach and for $175,000 against the inducing owner.We reverse and remand with directions. We have repeatedly held that a verdict may not be directed unless the evidence all points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inference which sustain the position of the party against whom the motion is made†¦. On the record presented it may not be said, as a matter of law, that the option and pension clauses were unessential and hence severable. Neither can it be said, as a matter of law, that without the resolution of the controversy ver those clauses Sharman agreed to the assignment of the contract to the owner s of the Utah Stars. The pertinent intent questions required factual determination by the jury under proper instructions. The court erred in directing a verdict against Sharman and in favor of Mountain States on the liability issue. The judgments are severally reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion. National Football League Players Ass’n v. National Football League Management Council 233 Cal. Rptr. 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986The Raiders and Management council content that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in that he made an error in law by failing to apply the doctrine of mitigation of damages. They further content that the award violates public policy and that the award was incorrectly calculated. We affirm the judgment. Pastorini’s dispute with the Raiders clearly falls within the ambit of section 301(a) of the labor Management Relations Act, which pertains to â€Å"suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a la bor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce†¦. Therefore, we must apply federal substantive law†¦. However; we may also rely on the state law if it is compatible with the purposes of federal law†¦. We conclude that offset is inapplicable in the instant case and that the arbitrator did not make an error of law. This court may reverse the arbitrator’s award only if there is a manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction†¦. No such manifest disregard appears in the instant case. The judgment is affirmed.Alabama Football, Inc. v. Stabler 319 So. 2d 678 (Ala. 1975) Stabler filed a complaint on December 4, 1974, seeking a declaratory judgment and other relief, contending that the defendant had breached its contract with Stabler by failing to pay the balance due in 1974 under the contract between the parties; that the terms of the contract prohibited him from negotiating a contract w ith any other professional football club; and that irreparable damage would result to him if the contract was not held to be null and void.After a hearing, the trail court entered its judgment on January 6, 1975, holding that the contract between Stabler and Alabama Football, Inc. had been breached by Alabama Football, Inc. and that Stabler was free from any obligation under any terms of the contract. Since there was substantial evidence from which the trail court could have concluded that appellant was unable to perform its contract with Stabler, we find no basis for reversal on this point†¦.